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ABSTRACT
Few fields of law impact as wide a swath of population as consumer
protection law. Alaska adopted its consumer protection statute, the Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPCPA), amid a national
movement to strengthen consumer protection laws. The UTPCPA uses broad
language to encompass a wide range of conduct. However, creative pleading
and recent applications of the UTPCPA have expanded the law in ways that
threaten Alaska businesses even in the absence of culpable conduct. This Note
reviews the history of consumer protection, Alaska’s UTPCPA, and the
incentives leading to an expanding application of the UTPCPA. The Note
concludes by proposing potential legislative solutions to rein in abuse of the
Act.
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INTRODUCTION
Few fields of law impact as wide a swath of population as
consumer protection law. After all, modern societies and economies
demand that virtually all citizens fulfill their wants and needs in the
market. State consumer protection acts became popular in the 1960s and
1970s after the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) proved unable to
prevent or punish fraudulent or deceptive practices through national
actions. Modeled after and encouraged by the FTC, these acts are often
referred to as “Little FTC Acts.” Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act1 (UTPCPA) has noble goals—to shield
Alaskans from unfair and deceptive merchants and to promote the flow
of trade. Like similar “Little FTC Acts” across the country, the UTPCPA
is broadly worded to encompass a wide range of conduct and to evolve
with the times. Broad language, however, can also result in inconsistent
application of the law. This Note makes the case that decisions by
Alaska courts over the past decade have distorted the meaning of the
statute and have applied it in ways that harm small businesses and put
Alaskan consumers at risk. In Part I, this Note begins by examining the
history of consumer protection law from common law fraud to the FTC
to the rise of “Little FTC Acts.” Part II introduces the features of the
Alaska UTPCPA and compares it to other similar state statutes. Part III
explores where things went wrong with the application of the UTPCPA,
and finally, Part IV suggests how changing the Act could better serve
the interests of both citizens and businesses.

I. THE HISTORY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
Prior to modern state consumer protection laws, consumers could
bring actions at common law for fraud or misrepresentation against
sellers of goods or services. The Writ of Deceit was one of the earliest
actions at common law, dating back to 1201.2 With such a long history,
fraud and misrepresentation developed a clear jurisprudence. Early in
this country’s development, the test for fraud or misrepresentation was
described as:
If a man represents as true that which he knows to be false, and
makes the representation in such a way or under such
circumstances as to induce a reasonable man to believe that it is
true, and is meant to be acted on, and the person to whom the
1. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.471–45.50.561 (2010).
2. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 105, at 727 (5th ed.
1984).
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representation has been made, believing it to be true, acts upon
the faith of it, and by so acting sustains damage, there is fraud
to support an action of deceit at law, and to be a ground for the
rescission of the transaction in equity.3
In Alaska today, the test for intentional misrepresentation remains
the same. “Alaska law imposes an independent duty to refrain from the
tort of intentional misrepresentation. The essential elements of that tort
are: (1) a false representation of fact, (2) knowledge of the falsity of the
representation, (3) intention to induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance,
and (5) damages.”4
An important element of the common law tort of fraud or
intentional misrepresentation is the requirement of scienter. A plaintiff
bringing an action for fraud or intentional misrepresentation must
demonstrate “proof that the maker knew of the untrue character of his
or her representation.”5 Further, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant made a false representation, knew of the falsehood, and
intended to misrepresent the information.6 Often these requirements
create a significant hurdle to plaintiffs and limit consumers’ protection
from fraud and misrepresentation.7
Up until the early twentieth century, the predominant form of
protection that the government provided to consumers was two Latin
words of warning: caveat emptor.8 Caveat emptor left the consumer to his
own judgment to determine the quality of a good or the accuracy of
merchants’ sales pitches, and it assumed the consumer could bargain
with merchants and choose which merchants to patronize on the basis of
their reputations.9 This reliance on individualism and reputation for
consumer protection worked in an economy where consumers did most
of their dealing face to face with small merchants. But, as
industrialization expanded the capabilities to produce and market goods
to a large number of people, consumers began calling for an end to the

3. Lowe v. Trundle, 78 Va. 65, 67 (1883) (citation omitted).
4. Jarvis v. Ensminger, 134 P.3d 353, 363 (Alaska 2006) (citing City of
Fairbanks v. Amoco Chem. Co., 952 P.2d 1173, 1176 n.4 (Alaska 1998)).
5. Bubbel v. Wein Air Alaska, Inc., 682 P.2d 374, 381 (Alaska 1984) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. b (1977)).
6. Id.
7. See William A. Lovett, Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: State Deceptive Trade
Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 754 n.86 (1972).
8. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of
Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) (“Although the strength
of caveat emptor as a concept in American law had diminished by the beginning
of the twentieth century, common law remedies remained inadequate to protect
consumers in some situations.”).
9. Lovett, supra note 7, at 727.
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doctrine of caveat emptor.10 While consumer movements began to erode
the influence of caveat emptor through the beginning of the twentieth
century, it was not until the 1930s and the strengthening of the FTC that
the law departed from the doctrine of caveat emptor in any significant
fashion.11
A.

Nascent Consumer Protection: The Development of the Federal
Trade Commission

In 1914, Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC
Act),12 which was the first major step in consumer protection and unfair
competition law. At its roots, however, the FTC was designed to prevent
unethical business practices from harming the flow of commerce, not to
protect consumers.13 It was essentially an extension and evolution of
antitrust law.14 An early aim of the FTC was to “discover and make
explicit those unexpressed standards of fair dealing which the
conscience of the community may progressively develop.”15 Moreover,
courts interpreted the FTC’s initial powers as covering only anticompetitive practices between businesses, not as providing consumer
protection.16 In FTC v. Raladam Co., the Supreme Court emphasized that
the power of the FTC under section 5 of the FTC Act17 depended on the
10. Id.
11. Id. at 728.
12. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58
(2006)).
13. See Michael I. Miller, Comment, The Class Action (Un)Fairness Act of 2005:
Could it Spell the End of the Multi–State Consumer Class Action?, 36 PEPP. L. REV.
879, 883 (2009) (citing Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Acts or Practices” in
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225, 226 (1981)); see also
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 7–8.
14. Miller, supra note 13, at 883; see also Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer
Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse by Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance as an
Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 11 (2006) (the original purpose of the
Federal Trade Commission was to curb monopolistic behavior on the part of
businesses, not to help consumers). For a detailed historical review of events
leading to the creation of the FTC, see Mark D. Bauer, The Licensed Professional
Exemption in Consumer Protection: At Odds With Antitrust History and Precedent, 73
TENN. L. REV. 131, 133–54 (2006).
15. Stephen Buckingham, Comment, Distinguishing Deception and Fraud:
Expanding the Scope of Statutory Remedies Available in Pennsylvania for Violations of
State Consumer Protection Law, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1025, 1042 (2005) (quoting FTC v.
Standard Educ. Soc’y, 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936), rev’d in part, 302 U.S. 112
(1937)).
16. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 646–47 (1931).
17. Section 5 of the original FTC Act stated, “unfair methods of competition
in commerce are hereby declared unlawful. The Commission is hereby
empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . .
from using unfair methods of competition in commerce.” § 5, 38 Stat. at 719.
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prerequisites “(1) that the methods complained of are unfair, [and] (2)
that they are methods of competition in commerce.”18 Thus, the original
FTC Act covered only “unfair method[s] of competition” that injured the
business of a competitor, not deceptive or unfair practices that hurt only
the consuming public.19 When all or most members of an industry used
a deceptive practice that harmed consumers, the courts were unable to
provide a remedy, as the practices were not unfair in the sense that they
harmed competition.20
Only in 1938 did the FTC begin to resemble the consumer
watchdog it is today. In passing the Wheeler-Lea Act,21 Congress gave
the FTC broad powers to regulate business practices that were unfair to
the individual citizen-consumer.22 The FTC finally had the power to
protect consumers with the declaration that “[u]nfair methods of
competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce, are . . . unlawful.”23 Further, Congress gave the FTC broad
discretion regarding when, where, and how the Commission would
act.24 Congress trusted the Commission to bring actions only when they
were justified and in the interest of the public at large.25
Given the choice to specifically proscribe defined instances of
unfair or deceptive conduct, Congress declined because “it would
undertake an endless task” if it tried to provide an exhaustive list of
illegal actions.26 Also, Congress decided not to provide specific
definitions for “unfair” and “deceptive,” choosing instead to allow its
decisions and regulations to shape the meanings of the terms as times
and practices changed.27 Such indeterminateness allowed for flexibility
to evolve according to community standards and market changes.28

18. Raladam, 283 U.S. at 646.
19. See id. at 649; see also Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 11.
20. See Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir.
1941) (noting that the FTC under the Raladam rule was powerless to help the
public when there was not a threat to competition); see also Scheuerman, supra
note 14, at 11.
21. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006)).
22. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 8–9.
23. See § 3, 52 Stat. at 111.
24. See id.
25. Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act:
Reconsidering the FTC as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 437, 437 (1991).
26. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 8 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1142, at
19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.)).
27. Sovern, supra note 25, at 443.
28. Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry Smith, Patching the Holes in the Consumer
Product Safety Net: Using State Unfair Practices Laws to Make Handguns and Other
Consumer Goods Safer, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 299 (2000) (“UDAP statutes are
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Congress has still not explicitly defined what constitutes a “deceptive”
act or practice, and it did not do so with “unfair” acts or practices until
the 1994 amendments narrowing the FTC Act.29
Congress specifically chose not to grant individual private rights of
action under the FTC Act. In fact, a proposal to allow a private right of
action failed during the FTC Act negotiations; the opponents voiced
concerns about abusive litigation by some plaintiffs’ attorneys.30
Consumers were left with rights of action based in common law fraud or
breach of contract.31 As a result, consumers generally found that it was
“less expensive to suffer most deceptive trade practices than to remedy
them through legal action.”32
B.

Development of State Law “Little FTC Acts”

The inadequacies of the FTC came to a head in the late 1960s when
two independent incendiary reports were released chastising the FTC
for its inefficiency and failure to benefit consumers.33 First, Ralph Nader
led a group of law students—later termed Nader’s Raiders—who
reviewed FTC documents and decisions.34 The Nader Report portrayed
an ineffective and bureaucratic FTC with a long list of consumer
protection failures.35 Second, in response to the Nader Report, President
Nixon commissioned the American Bar Association (ABA) to review the

undeniably, and purposefully, broad and flexible in scope, and the delegations
of regulatory authority in those statutes are similarly broad.”).
29. See Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy With Deceptive Trade Practices
Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305, 1321 (2001) (citing Federal Trade
Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, 108 Stat. 1691
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006))).
30. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 12 (citing 51 CONG. REC. 13,113–
18 (1914)). A proposed amendment to the Act by Senator Clapp of Minnesota
would have provided:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by any
other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or
declared to be unlawful by this act may sue therefore in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides
or may be found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained and the costs of
the suit, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee.
51 CONG. REC. 13,113. The amendment was rejected forty-one to eighteen.
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 14.
31. Buckingham, supra note 15, at 1027.
32. Id. (quoting Lovett, supra note 7, at 725).
33. See Miller, supra note 13, at 886.
34. EDWARD F. COX ET AL., “THE NADER REPORT” ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 3 (Richard W. Baron Publishing Co. 2d ed. 1969).
35. Id. at 37–95.
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consumer protection efforts of the FTC.36 While the ABA Report was not
as scathing as the Nader Report, it highlighted the same failures and
found the FTC’s consumer protection efforts to be inadequate.37
As the 1960s came to a close, the FTC was prepared to admit that it
could not respond to all the consumer claims it received as well as unfair
competition claims from businesses.38 An initial model for state
legislation on consumer protection came from an FTC proposal itself,
and the FTC collaborated with state governments and the Committee on
Suggested State Legislation to develop false advertising statutes.39
Similarly, in 1964 the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.40 Unhappy with this effort,41 the FTC again collaborated with the
Committee on Suggested State Legislation to develop its own model
statute, the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.42
Three versions of the statute were promulgated to give state
legislatures options in fitting the provision into existing state codes. The
first option banned all “unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”43
The second provided a slightly modified provision against “false,
misleading, or deceptive methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”44
Finally, the third option listed twelve specific banned practices plus a
catch-all provision that made illegal “any act or practice which is unfair
or deceptive to the consumer.”45 The consumer protection movement

36. Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 13 n.79; COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FTC,
REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 4
(1969) [hereinafter ABA Report].
37. See ABA Report, supra note 36, at 37.
38. See Debra P. Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical
Analysis of Attorney’s Fees Provisions in Consumer Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 483, 490–91 (2008).
39. See Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 15; see also Lovett, supra note 7, at 730.
40. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1964) (amended 1966)
(withdrawn 2000).
41. Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 15. Specifically, the FTC disliked that the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act did not authorize action by the state
attorney general and believed that the catch-all provision could cause confusion.
Id.
42. UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW (1970) (Comm.
on Suggested State Legislation).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The twelve enumerated deceptive practices were:
(1) passes off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the
source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;
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quickly gained momentum, and by 1973, a mere three years later, fortyfour of the fifty states had already passed some version of the model
act.46
The various state consumer protection acts (CPAs) had done little
to change the status quo by the mid-1970s. Both the FTC and the state
attorneys general—who were initially the only parties capable of
bringing state law actions—”confine[d] their activities to cases likely to
have a broad impact.”47 The state attorneys general quickly found that
they had the same problems that the FTC did prior to Ralph Nader’s
excoriation: limited staff, limited resources, and an abundance of claims
being filed by their citizens.48 Consequently, states gradually
incorporated private rights of action for individual consumers to sue
unsavory businesses.49 A private right of action alone may still underdeter unfair and deceptive practices.50 To sweeten the pot, many states
added treble damages, punitive damages, or statutory minimum
(3) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to
affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another;
(4) uses deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin
in connection with goods or services;
(5) represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval,
characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not
have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or
connection that he does not have;
(6) represents that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated,
altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or second-hand;
(7) represents that goods or services are of a particular standard,
quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they
are of another;
(8) disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false or
misleading representation of fact;
(9) advertises goods or services with intent not to sell them as
advertised;
(10) advertises goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably
expectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a
limitation of quantity;
(11) makes false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons
for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions; or
(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood
of confusion or of misunderstanding.
UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2 (1966); see also Sovern, supra note 25, at
446–47.
46. Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 17–18.
47. Jon Mize, Comment, Fencing Off the Path of Least Resistance: Re-Examining
the Role of Little FTC Act Actions in the Law of False Advertising, 72 TENN. L. REV.
653, 660 (2005) (quoting Sovern, supra note 25, at 448).
48. Sovern, supra note 25, at 448.
49. Id. at 448–49.
50. See William A. Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23
ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 289 (1971).
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damages provisions.51 Many also awarded attorneys’ fees to prevailing
consumer plaintiffs to incentivize the bringing of actions.52
C.

Modern State Consumer Protection Acts—The Rise of Private
Actions

Today, the CPA laws of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia53 have each evolved based on the needs of the citizens and the
demands of the era. Ensuring that victims of consumer fraud have
access to the courts is particularly important in today’s climate of
predatory lending, identity theft, and e-commerce situations in which

51. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 38, at 495.
52. Id. at 484.
53. See Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 18–20; CAROLYN L. CARTER &
JONATHON SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES app. A (7th ed.
2008). The fifty state statutes currently in effect are: ALA. CODE §§ 8-19-1–8-19-15
(2010); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.471–45.50.561 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 441521–44-1534 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-101–4-88-207 (2010); CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1750–1785 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-101–6-1-115 (2010); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 42-110a–42-110q (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2511–2527, 2580–2584
(2010) (Consumer Fraud Act); id. §§ 2531–2536 (2010) (Deceptive Trade Practices
Act); D.C. CODE §§ 28-3901–28-3913 (2010); FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201–501.213 (2010);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-370–10-1-375 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 480-1–480-24
(2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-601–48-619 (2010); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1–
505/12 (2010) (Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act); id. at
510/1–510/7; IND. CODE §§ 24-5-0.5-1–24-5-0.5-12 (2010); IOWA CODE §§ 714.16–
714.16A (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-623–50-640, 50-675a–50-679a (2009); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.110–367.990 (LexisNexis 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
51:1401–51:1420 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1211–1216 (2009); MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-101–13-501 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.93A §§
1–11 (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.901–445.922 (2010); MINN. STAT. §§
325D.43–325D.48 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.010–407.307 (2010); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 30-14-101–30-14-142 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-301–87-306 (2010);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598.0903–598.0999 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:1–
358-A:13 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1–56:8-91 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 57-12-1–57-12-22 (2010); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349–350 (Consol. 2010); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1–75-35 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-15-01–51-15-11 (2009);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4165.01–4165.04 (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78,
§§ 51–55 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.605–646.656 (2009); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
201-1–201-10 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-13.1-1–6-13.1-27 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-5-10–39-5-160 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-24-1–37-24-35 (2010); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-101–47-18-125 (2010); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41–
17.63 (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-2-1–13-2-8 (LexisNexis 2010); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451–2480g (2010); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196–59.1-207 (2010);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010–19.86.920 (2010); W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-6-101–46A6-110 (2010); WIS. STAT. §§ 100.18, 100.20–100.264 (2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4012-101–40-12-114 (2010); 5 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 32101–32603 (2010); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 3, §§ 341–341w (2010); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 101–123, 180–185
(2010).
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there is never face to face contact with a fraudulent merchant.54 States
articulated five predominant legislative purposes in passing “Little
FTC” CPAs:
1) To wholly compensate victims for losses;
2) To punish fraudulent offenders;
3) To make the bringing of cases feasible even when
attorneys’ fees might be greater than a potential
damages award;
4) To encourage members of the bar to take on
consumer protection cases; and
5) To deter future fraud, deception, and unfair trade
practices.55
The most important difference between the FTC Act and “Little
FTC Acts” is a private right of action.56 In 2009, Iowa became the last of
the fifty states to grant a private right of action for consumer fraud
claims.57 Private rights of action allow consumers to protect themselves
from fraud, misrepresentation, and other deceptive trade practices
without the constraints that come with actions at common law, and they
provide an extra deterrent to injurious merchants and businesses.58
During the period when states enacted “Little FTC Acts,” one consumer
protection advocate argued: “Without effective private remedies the
widespread economic losses that result from these trade practices
remain uncompensated, and furthermore, private remedies are highly
desirable for additional consumer bargaining power and more complete
discipline against fraud in the marketplace.”59 Several features of “Little
FTC Acts” help to encourage consumer actions; however, these features
vary widely across the states. These features, and their differences, are
discussed in the following sections.
54. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 38, at 488; see also Sovern, supra note 29,
at 1354–58 (examining the roles of state CPAs in e-commerce and personal data
management contexts).
55. Stark & Choplin, supra note 38, at 499.
56. Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under “Little
FTC Acts”: Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV. 373, 375 (1990); see
also DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, 1 CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE
LAW § 2:10, at 41 (2010); Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 23–25. During the same
time that states were enacting consumer protection statutes, the Nixon
administration attempted to develop a federal private right of action for unfair
or deceptive trade practices, but internal opposition resulted in the proposition
never gaining any real traction. Lovett, supra note 50, 279–80.
57. Rob Sand, Note, Fraud’s Final Frontier: Iowa’s Battle Over Becoming the
Final State to Allow Private Consumer Fraud Actions, 35 IOWA J. CORP. L. 615, 623
(2010). The bill was H.F. 712, 84th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2009).
58. Stark & Choplin, supra note 38, at 484.
59. Lovett, supra note 50, at 271.
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1. Increased Damages Awards
Most unfair or deceptive trade practices do not result in significant
harm to individual consumers.60 Consequently, normal remedies would
result in little incentive for any injured parties to bring claims of unfair
or deceptive trade practices.61 The punishment and deterrent functions
of private actions would not materialize.62 To encourage private parties
to litigate their unfair or deceptive trade practices claims, CPAs allow
for various methods to increase damages.63
Similarly, harm from unfair or deceptive practices normally falls
below the costs of bringing a lawsuit.64 Without an award of attorneys’
fees, “the costs of going to court were so formidable that it was rarely
worth it for consumers to litigate claims involving relatively small
amounts of money.”65 To encourage private actions and to “mak[e] the
consumer’s access to justice really viable,”66 consumer protection
statutes typically allow for prevailing plaintiffs to recover reasonable
attorneys’ fees and court costs.67
Twenty states set a minimum damages award for successful
plaintiffs to encourage litigation of harms normally too insignificant to
litigate.68 The minimum damages award varies from as low as $2569 to as
high as $2000,70 and the plaintiff is awarded the higher of the actual or
60. In a survey on consumer fraud conducted in 2005, the FTC found the
median loss due to fraud to be $60. KEITH B. ANDERSON, FTC, CONSUMER FRAUD
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SECOND FTC SURVEY 45 (2007), available at
http://ftc.gov/opa/2007/10/fraud.pdf.
61. CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 53, § 13.1, at 807.
62. Id.
63. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:10, at 448–50.
64. See ANDERSON, supra note 60, at 47 (finding the median amount paid in
connection with consumer fraud was $60 and the seventy-fifth percentile was
$200).
65. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:17, at 476.
66. Lovett, supra note 7, at 744.
67. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 25–26; Stark & Choplin, supra
note 38, at 484, 496 (surveying consumer protection laws in all fifty states and
finding that forty-five allow for courts to award plaintiffs attorneys’ fees); see also
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, app. 6A at 541–43 (providing a table of the
availability of attorneys’ fees for unfair and deceptive practices claims).
68. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:10, at 448–49; see also id. §
6:11, at 450, app. 6A at 542–43; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(a)(1) (2010) (greater
of actual damages or $100); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780 (West 2010) (actual damages
but not less than $1000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(2) (2010) (greater of actual
damages or $500); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(3) (2010) (greater of actual
damages or $25); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.911(2) (2010) (greater of actual
damages or $250); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(1) (2010) (greater of actual
damages or $500); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(2) (2010) (greater of actual
damages or $2000).
69. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(3) (2010).
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19(2) (2010).
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statutory damages. Some states also extend minimum damages to deter
particular frauds, primarily those against the elderly.71 Further, a
plaintiff does not always need to show any damages in order to collect
statutory damages.72
Most states allow courts to treble damages in private consumer
protection lawsuits in order to punish some forms of bad behavior.73
Treble damages, unlike statutory minimum damages, require the
plaintiff to show actual damages.74 In some states, treble damages apply
when a trier of fact finds the defendant acted willfully, knowingly,
intentionally, or in bad faith.75 A few states provide treble damages to
every plaintiff who shows a violation of the consumer protection
statute.76 Generally, because actual damages must be shown and
because there is often a trigger requiring some form of bad behavior,
treble damages help deter larger frauds while minimum damages help
deter smaller frauds.77
A smaller number of states explicitly allow judges to award
punitive damages to successful plaintiffs.78 Punitive damages in
consumer protection acts serve the same purposes as in common law
fraud actions—they are intended to punish egregious actions and to
deter other potential injurers.79 Some consumer protection acts call for
punitive damages when the defendant injured some vulnerable class of
victims, such as the elderly or disabled.80

71. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, app.6A at 542–43; see, e.g., HAW.
REV. STAT. § 480-13(b)(1) (2010).
72. See Carter v. LaChance, 766 A.2d 717, 719 (N.H. 2001) (interpreting the
New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:1–
358-A:13 (2010), which states that the court “shall award” minimum damages
upon a showing of a violation of the statute, to mean that the plaintiff does not
need to demonstrate actual damages).
73. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 23; PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra
note 56, § 6:10, at 449.
74. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:10, at 449; see, e.g., Sign-O-Lite
Signs, Inc. v. DeLaurenti Florists, Inc., 825 P.2d 714, 721 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
75. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:10, at 449; see, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. § 10-1-399(c) (2010) (requiring treble damages for intentional violations);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9(3) (2010) (allowing a court to award up to three
times actual damages for willful and knowing violations).
76. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a) (2010); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)
(LexisNexis 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-13 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19
(West 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2010); see Schwartz & Silverman, supra note
8, at 23.
77. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:10, at 449.
78. Id. § 6:16, at 467.
79. Id. § 6.16, at 467–68.
80. See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 53, at 845; see, e.g., ARK CODE ANN. § 488-204 (2010).
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2. Class Actions
Class actions provide another method to remedy wrongs that cause
only small harms against individuals, but the collective harm is large
enough to warrant litigation costs. Critics of class action suits claim that
plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking a windfall, rather than aggrieved
consumers, pursue them, and the attorneys bring cases regardless of
whether they are meritorious.81 Further, because damages and litigation
costs are so high for class actions, even innocent defendants may settle a
claim to avoid a costly trial or any risk of a potentially bankrupting
settlement.82
“Little FTC Acts” vary widely in how they treat class action
lawsuits. A few states explicitly prohibit class actions by private
parties.83 Others explicitly provide that class action suits are available to
plaintiffs.84 The majority of “Little FTC Acts” remain silent on the
availability of class action suits.85 Where the legislation neither prohibits
nor authorizes class action consumer protection suits, most states allow
class actions under their general rules.86
Because class actions present lucrative opportunities for named
plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys, some states that allow consumer

81. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING
PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 4 (2000); see generally Scheuerman, supra note 14.
82. Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 38.
83. ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(f) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(a) (2010); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409(A) (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(4) (2010); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30.14-133(1) (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-5-202(1), (3) (2010); see also
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, app.6A at 541–43.
84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (2010); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k)(1)
(LexisNexis 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-13(c) (LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 48-608(1) (2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(b) (LexisNexis 2010);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(b)–(d) (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(2)
(West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.911(3) (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. §
407.025(2)–(3) (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:10-a (LexisNexis 2010);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(E) (LexisNexis 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1345.09(B) (LexisNexis 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-5.2(b) (2010); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-11-19(3) (West 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108(b) (2010); see also
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, app.6A at 541–43.
85. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 29; PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra
note 56, § 6:29, at 516, app.6A at 541–43.
86. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 29; PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra
note 56, § 6:29, at 516. The general rationale for allowing consumer protection
class actions when the “Little FTC Act” remains silent on the issue is that
“[u]nless there is a clear and direct statutory provision precluding class actions
for a given cause of action, then class actions are authorized.” Karen S. Little,
LLC v. Drury Inns, Inc., 306 S.W.3d 577, 583 (Mo. App. Ct. 2010); cf. Tucker v.
Sierra Builders, 180 S.W.3d 109, 115 n.9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“The [Tennessee
Consumer Protection] Act limits private actions to ‘individual’ claims.
Accordingly, class actions cannot be maintained under the TCPA.”).
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protection class actions have restrictions or safeguards against abuse.87
A few states limit the recovery in consumer protection class action suits
to actual damages and prevent plaintiffs from recovering statutory or
minimum damages.88
3. The Reliance Requirement
In a common law action for fraud or misrepresentation, plaintiffs
must show that they relied on a vendor’s statements and that the
reliance was justified before recovering any damages allegedly caused
by a misstatement.89 A few states continue to require plaintiffs in
consumer protection cases to show reliance on an alleged
misrepresentation,90 but most do not require any showing of reliance.91
Those states that do not require a showing of reliance generally follow
the test from federal FTC cases: whether the act has the tendency or
capacity to deceive consumers.92 By eliminating the reliance
requirement, those states eliminated a hurdle for plaintiffs but also
allowed for awards based on conduct that may have caused no harm.93
D.

The Evolution of State CPAs

States found that “Little FTC Acts” provided citizens and
businesses with “double barrel” protection when the “big FTC” in
Washington could not or would not act.94 Attorneys general could bring
large actions in the public interest on behalf of the state, while
individual consumers could bring smaller private actions with bonuses
such as statutory damages and attorneys’ fees.95 Though generally based
on the same model acts, the state statutes quickly began to diverge in
language and application.96 On one extreme, California’s Unfair
Competition Law97 allows virtually anyone to sue on the basis of
consumer fraud on behalf of the public, regardless of whether they were

87. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 6:34, at 536.
88. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 29; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 61-113(2) (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(E) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 1311-19(2) (2010).
89. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 3:3, at 56–57; see also Lowe v.
Trundle, 78 Va. 65, 67 (1883).
90. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 18.
91. Id. at 19; PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 56, § 3:4, at 57.
92. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 19.
93. See Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 38.
94. Sovern, supra note 29, at 1349–51.
95. Id.
96. See generally James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from
Judges Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L. J. 1, 7 (1994).
97. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997).
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personally injured or even impacted.98 On the other extreme, as
previously mentioned, Iowa had no private action at all until late 2009
and only established one in response to price gouging during relief
efforts from a disastrous flood.99
CPAs were not intended to be limitless, although increasingly
“creative” applications of them in the courts may make them seem so.
Reverence for federal FTC precedent and careful definitions are among
the statutory tools that states can employ to rein in use of consumer
statutes.100 Analysis can be difficult; as these statutes typically have been
on the books for only forty years or less, common law decisions are
fewer than in more established fields of law. Many states choose to defer
to FTC decisions and federal court interpretations, but federal appellate
courts and FTC panels handle cases from different perspectives and
with different resources than a lower state court.101 Even if a state
purports to align its consumer action analysis with the FTC, it often falls
short in practice. This dichotomy can result in clear federal FTC
violations not violating state CPAs, and vice versa.102
One major issue is that the field is still unsettled and rapidly
developing; with relatively little common law to guide them, many state
courts treat every case as one of first impression and interpret CPAs
inconsistently.103 Much as Justice Louis Brandeis104 and later Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor105 proclaimed that states should serve as
legislative laboratories, each state has had to examine and, when
needed, amend and update its CPA statute to better serve its citizens.
The next section will examine Alaska’s version of the statute as well as
how the Alaska courts and Legislature have dealt with some of these
challenges.

98. Alan S. Brown & Larry E. Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes
Across the Fifty States, 55 FDCC QUARTERLY 263, 265–66 (2005).
99. See Sand, supra note 57.
100. Kaplan & Smith, supra note 28, at 281.
101. See Nehf, supra note 96, at 7.
102. Richard E. Day, The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act: Sleeping
Giant or Elusive Panacea?, 33 S.C. L. REV. 479, 507 (1982).
103. Bauer, supra note 14, at 132.
104. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory.”).
105. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“This case exemplifies the role of States as laboratories. The States’ core police
powers have always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.”).
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II. THE ALASKA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
Amidst the developing consumer protection backdrop, Alaska has
continued to refine its own UTPCPA since its initial enactment in
1970.106 Alaska based the UTPCPA “on legislation developed in large
part by the Federal Trade Commission, [and it] is designed to meet the
increasing need in Alaska for the protection of consumers as well as
honest businessmen from the depredations of those persons employing
unfair or deceptive trade practices.”107 The language in Alaska’s
UTPCPA parallels the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act108 drafted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.109
As a result, Alaska’s Act contains a list of specifically prohibited
practices that is followed by a catch-all provision. Alaska adopted a
modified version of the twelve enumerated practices from the model
act110—but then added even more. As of January 2011, there are fiftyseven acts or practices banned in the “laundry list.”111 The Alaska
Legislature appears far from daunted by the “endless task” of
identifying prohibited acts.112
Some commentators have asked whether the “laundry list” state
consumer protection statutes may run into constitutionality issues.
Specifically, even though the statute explicitly states that the list of
enumerated practices is non-exclusive,113 could a defendant challenge
the statute facially on void-for-vagueness grounds?114 In State v. O’Neill
106. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (b)(1)–(57) (2010).
107. Judiciary Committee Report on HCSCS for Senate Bill No. 352, ALASKA H.
JOURNAL SUPP. NO. 10 AT 1, 1970 ALASKA H. JOURNAL 744.
108. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1964) (amended 1966)
(withdrawn 2000).
109. W. Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc., 101 P.3d 1047, 1052–53
(Alaska 2004).
110. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(1)–(11) with the twelve practices
enumerated in note 45, supra. Alaska appears to have combined the first two
enumerated practices in the model statute.
111. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(1)–(57).
112. See H.R. REP. NO. 1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.); see also text
accompanying note 26.
113. It actually does so in two places. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b) (“The
terms ‘unfair methods of competition’ and ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’
include, but are not limited to, the following acts.”); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(c)
(“The unlawful acts and practices listed in (b) of this section are in addition to
and do not limit the types of unlawful acts and practices actionable at common
law or under other state statutes.”).
114. For a well-reasoned debate regarding a statute of similar construction,
see Albert L. Norton, Jr., The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act and the
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine, 40 S.C. L. REV. 641 (1989). Norton concluded that the
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act was likely unconstitutionally vague.
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Investigations, Inc. the Alaska Supreme Court held that the UTPCPA is
not unconstitutionally vague, and it also importantly noted that the
statute is remedial rather than penal.115 With constitutional challenges
out of the way, Alaska plaintiffs put the UTPCPA to frequent use—
within four years of O’Neill Investigations, Alaska was second in the
nation in complaints brought under CPAs per capita, with 6.39 actions
brought per 1000 Alaska residents.116
The rest of this part will highlight some of the notable features
available to consumers in the UTPCPA.
A.

Mechanisms of Plaintiffs’ Actions

Like most states, Alaska permits consumer actions to be brought
under the statute by both the state attorney general and individual
consumers. As discussed previously, most actions brought by state
attorneys general mirror those brought by the federal FTC—generally
large actions that are clearly in the public interest.117 Although Alaska’s
UTPCPA does not explicitly authorize or prohibit private parties from
bringing class action lawsuits,118 class actions are permitted by Alaska
Civil Rule 23.119
Smaller actions are cost prohibitive and difficult to fully investigate,
particularly given Alaska’s unique geography. The attorney general
One convincing piece of evidence against such a statute being unconstitutional is
that the federal FTC Act has been held by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit not to be overly vague. The panel held that “unfair methods of
competition” is no more vague than “due process of law.” Id. at 644–45 (quoting
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919)).
115. Id. at 647–48, 659 (citing State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520
(Alaska 1980)). Notably, the O’Neill Investigations court did state in dicta that
although the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, there were no guiding
regulations promulgated by the Attorney General’s office to aid with application
and interpretation of the statute: “We think that it would be the better practice
for the Attorney General to exercise his discretionary rule-making power to fill
in the interstices of the Alaska Act rather than relying exclusively on
adjudication.” 609 P.2d at 533 n.49.
116. Anthony Paul Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Protection: The Practical
Effectiveness of State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59 TUL. L. REV. 427, 440
(1984). Delaware was first on the list, but the unusual number of companies
incorporated there (with little other presence) and the liberal construction of its
statute make it something of an anomaly. Based on actions brought by actual
citizens against businesses doing business within the state’s borders, Alaska may
well have been number one.
117. Mize, supra note 47, at 660.
118. The title of section 45.50.531 of the Alaska Statutes is “[p]rivate and class
actions,” but the text does not mention class action suits. See ALASKA STAT. §
45.50.531 (2010).
119. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 23; see, e.g., Turner v. Alaska Commc’ns Sys. Long
Distance, Inc., 78 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2003).
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cannot represent or advise individual citizens, who must have a private
attorney in all other circumstances.120 The exception is consumer claims
involving less than $10,000, in which case citizens can bring the action
themselves in small claims court without an attorney present.121
Alaska is one of the most aggressive states with respect to how
deeply attorney general actions penetrate the traditional domain of tort
law. For example, in O’Neill Investigations, the state brought an action
based on harassment, typically governed solely by tort law.122 The court
found that harassment of citizens over the phone by debt collectors was
an unfair or deceptive trade practice under section 45.50.471(a) of the
Alaska Statutes, presumably by using the “catch-all” provision.123 The
infusion of tort law causes of action into consumer protection statutes is
an example of how different states diverge in interpretation. North
Carolina’s consumer protection statute124 is very similar in its structure
to the Alaska UTPCPA, but North Carolina courts went the opposite
direction, holding that actions brought on the basis of traditional tort
law are not valid uses of the statute.125
Alaska is similar to many other states in that the burden of proof
for plaintiffs bringing consumer actions is substantially lower than the
burden in related actions such as breach of contract or common law
fraud.126 Often consumer protection actions do not require particularity
of pleading—effectively allowing attorneys general and citizens,
including plaintiffs lawyers, to sue now and find evidence (or hope for a
settlement) later.127 Critics allege that this makes state CPA claims,
including those in Alaska, exploitable as a “pile-on” charge—a fallback
with lower standards of proof that might stick when other tort law
120. ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION UNIT, CONSUMER
PROTECTION
IN
ALASKA
2
(2010),
available
at
http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/consumer/BrochureGeneric_web.pdf.
(hereinafter CONSUMER PROTECTION UNIT).
121. Id.
122. State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 536 (Alaska 1980);
Dunbar, supra note 116, at 451.
123. A specific provision on the “laundry list” addressing telephone
solicitation was not added until 1993. 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 60, 3 (codified
at ALASKA STAT. § 45.63); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(35) (2010) (listing violating
AS 45.63 (solicitations by telephonic means) as an unfair or deceptive trade
practice).
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1–75-49 (2010).
125. See Dunbar, supra note 116, at 451 n.42.
126. See, e.g., Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 5. (“State consumer
protection statutes have their origin in common law fraud and
misrepresentation claims as well as in federal consumer protection law. Yet,
when states adopted CPAs, they did not explicitly include many of the required
elements of the common law actions in the statutes.”).
127. Id. at 33–34.
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claims do not.128 For example, a recent federal case applying Alaska law
saw the plaintiffs, franchisees of a rental car company, assert twelve
separate causes of action in a suit against the parent company that
included UTPCPA claims alongside traditional breach of contract and
fraud claims.129 None of the nine states with “laundry list” consumer
protection acts that include a “catch-all” provision130 require plaintiffs to
prove the elements of common law fraud in consumer protection
actions.131 In Alaska, this has been the law since O’Neill Investigations.132
To bring an action, first a plaintiff must have standing.133 “The basic
requirement for standing in Alaska is adversity.”134 To bring a UTPCPA
claim the plaintiff must have interest-injury standing.135 “Under the
interest-injury standing test . . . [plaintiffs] must have an interest
adversely affected by the actions of [the defendants], and they must
have a ‘sufficient personal stake in the controversy to guarantee . . .
adversity.’”136
Then, “[t]wo elements must be proved to establish a prima facie
case of unfair or deceptive acts or practices under the [UTPCPA]: (1) that
the defendant is engaged in trade or commerce; and (2) that in the
128. Victor E. Schwartz, Cary Silverman & Christopher E. Appel, “That’s
Unfair!” Says Who—The Government or the Litigant?: Consumer Protection Claims
Involving Regulated Conduct, 47 WASHBURN L. J. 93, 94–95 (2007).
In many instances, CPA claims are “piled on” to product liability and
other tort claims. In other words, a plaintiffs’ lawyer may assert CPA
claims as a fallback should he or she fail to show that the product was
defective, that the defendant was negligent, or that his or her client was
injured as a result.
Id.
129. Alaska Rent–A–Car, Inc. v. Cendant Corp., No. 3:03-cv-00029-TMB, 2007
WL 2206784, at *1 (D. Alaska July 27, 2007).
130. See Buckingham, supra note 15, at 1034 nn.97 & 101. As of the latter part
of the decade, those states were Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (2010)),
Georgia (Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-371
(2010)), Idaho (Idaho Consumer Protection Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-601
(2010)), Maryland (Maryland Consumer Protection Act, MD. CODE ANN., Com.
Law § 13-101 (2010)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-1 (2010)), New
Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:1 (2010)), Rhode Island (Unfair Trade
Practice and Consumer Protection Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-1 (2010)), and
Tennessee (Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4718-101 (2010)).
131. Buckingham, supra note 15, at 1034–37.
132. Id.; see also State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 534–35
(Alaska 1980).
133. Neese v. Lithia Chrysler Jeep of Anchorage, Inc., 210 P.3d 1213, 1218
(Alaska 2009).
134. Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 327 (Alaska 1987).
135. Neese, 210 P.3d at 1219.
136. Id. (quoting Adams v. Pipeliners Union 798, 699 P.2d 343, 346 (Alaska
1985)).

OQUINNWATTERSON.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

314

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

11/21/2011 5:18 PM

VOL. 28:2

conduct of trade or commerce, an unfair act or practice has occurred.”137
First, an act or practice must be in the conduct of trade or commerce to
fall under the UTPCPA because “the entire thrust of the [UTPCPA] is
directed at regulating practices relating to transactions involving
consumer goods and services.”138 The term “consumer goods” is
“generally understood to mean goods ‘used or bought for use primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes.’”139 For instance, the
UTPCPA applies to services such as repairs140 and debt collection.141
Real property, however, is not a consumer good.142 Further, even the
sale of standing timber falls beyond the scope of the UTPCPA because it
is not a “consumer good” but rather real property.143 Similarly, the
servicing of a mortgage does not fall under the UTPCPA.144 While the
product must be a consumer good or service, the UTPCPA can still
apply to business-to-business transactions.145
Once an act or practice is in the conduct of trade or commerce, the
plaintiff must then show that the act or practice is unfair or deceptive.146
Alaska adopted the FTC definition of unfair or deceptive: “[a]n act or
practice is deceptive or unfair if it has the capacity or tendency to
deceive.”147 An act or practice can be unfair without being deceptive; in
order to determine if an act or practice is unfair, a trier of fact should
rely on:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has
been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise
whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of
some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of
unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
137. O’Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 534.
138. State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 412 (Alaska 1982).
139. Aloha Lumber Corp. v. Univ. of Alaska, 994 P.2d 991, 1002 (Alaska 1999)
(quoting ALASKA STAT. § 45.09.109 (2010)).
140. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(15) (2010) (repair services).
141. O’Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 534 (finding defendant debt collector
was “engaged in trade or commerce as a business entity, regulated under the
Department of Commerce”).
142. First Nat’l Bank, 609 P.2d at 412–14 (using the listed prohibitions in
section 45.50.471(b) of the Alaska Statutes as examples of consumer goods and
stating that the statute was “directed solely at regulating transactions involving
‘products and services sold to consumers in the popular sense.’” (quoting
Neveroski v. Blair, 358 A.2d 473, 480 (N.J. 1976))).
143. O’Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 534.
144. Barber v. Nat’l Bank of Alaska, 815 P.2d 857, 861 (Alaska 1991).
145. W. Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc., 101 P.3d 1047, 1052–53
(Alaska 2004).
146. See O’Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 534.
147. Id. at 534 (citing FTC v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 152 (1942)).
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unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).148
The plaintiff need not prove intent to deceive, or even that
deception actually happened; “[a]ll that is required is a showing that the
acts and practices were capable of being interpreted in a misleading
way.”149 Indeed, “[t]estimony of consumers that they were misled is
sufficient to sustain a prima facie case of unfair and deceptive
practices.”150 However, in Garrison v. Dixon151 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that a claim that was sufficient to meet the minimum standard in
Odom v. Fairbanks Memorial Hospital failed when the plaintiffs “never
produced credible evidence” to support the claim and the plaintiffs
brought the action in bad faith.152 In Kenai Chrysler Center, Inc. v.
Denison,153 the Alaska Supreme Court applied a flexible and case-specific
approach to find that a car dealership violated the UTPCPA in selling a
car to a developmentally disabled adult.154 There, the court specifically
noted that “[m]any other jurisdictions define ‘unfair or deceptive acts or
practices’ to extend beyond conduct specifically prohibited by statute or
common law; instead of looking for expressly prohibited conduct, these
cases focus on the unfairness of the disputed practice under the specific
circumstances presented.”155
B.

Damages

The UTPCPA allows the attorney general to obtain injunctive relief
on behalf of citizens as well as restitution and civil penalties ranging
from $1,000 to $25,000.156 Alaska is in the minority of states that allow
148. Id. at 535 (quoting FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244–45
n.5 (1972)); see also Kenai Chrysler Ctr., Inc. v. Denison, 167 P.3d 1240, 1255–57
(Alaska 2007).
149. Odom v. Fairbanks Mem’l Hosp., 999 P.2d 123, 132 (Alaska 2000)
(quoting O’Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 534–35).
150. O’Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d at 535.
151. 19 P.3d 1229 (Alaska 2001).
152. Id. at 1235.
153. 167 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2007).
154. Id. at 1256.
155. Id. The court looked to a Fourth Circuit case that defined an unfair trade
practice as an “inequitable assertion of power or position” and found that it is
possible for the exercise of a contractual right, “when it involves egregious and
aggravating conduct, to constitute an unfair . . . trade practice.” Id. (quoting S.
Atl. Ltd. P’ship of Tenn., L.P. v. Riese, 284 F.3d 518, 539–40 (4th Cir. 2002)). The
court also looked to a Georgia case where a seller’s failure to investigate the
validity of its title amounted to an unfair trade practice. Id. (citing Regency
Nissan, Inc. v. Taylor, 391 S.E.2d 467, 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)).
156. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.551(b) (2010); CONSUMER PROTECTION UNIT, supra
note 120, at 2.
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attorneys general and private citizens to pursue damages.157 The Alaska
UTPCPA formerly provided criminal as well as civil sanctions for unfair
trade practices, and although the state was one of the first and only ones
in the nation to do so, the criminal sanctions were removed in 1978 due
to concerns about constitutionality.158 Part of the difficulty remains,
however, as the attorney general can recover civil penalties from firsttime violators; other jurisdictions require a cease and desist order to be
issued and violated first.159
The most significant damages provisions in the Alaska UTPCPA
involve the damages available in private actions. Under the UTPCPA
successful plaintiffs may seek either three times the actual damages160 or
$500 for each violation.161 Describing the purpose of treble damages in
Alaska’s UTPCPA, the Alaska Supreme Court stated that “[t]he
legislative history of Alaska’s provision establishes that treble damages
were adopted not just to deter fraud, but also to encourage injured
parties to file suits under the UTPCPA and to ensure that they would be
adequately compensated for their efforts.”162 The statute’s language does
not clearly indicate that a court should award treble damages to every
successful plaintiff.163 However, in Kenai Chrysler the Alaska Supreme
Court noted that by allowing the court to provide other relief it

157. Lovett, supra note 7, at 740–41.
158. Paula W. Gold & Robert D. Cohan, State Protection of the Consumer:
Integration of Civil and Criminal Remedies, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 933, 946 (1977). The
criminal penalties provision was found in section 45.50.551(c) of the Alaska
Statutes but was repealed by 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 166, 21.
159. Gold & Cohan, supra note 158, at 936–37.
160. Kenai Chrysler, 167 P.3d at 1259–60 (“[Section 45.50.531(a) of the Alaska
Statutes] appears to authorize treble damages based solely on an allegation and
finding that the UTPCPA has been violated. In addition to specifying that treble
damages are to be awarded as a matter of course, subsection 531(a) goes on to
allow the court to ‘provide other relief it considers necessary and proper’—
thereby reinforcing the provision’s intent to make treble damages automatic.”
(quoting ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a) (2010))).
161. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a).
162. Kenai Chrysler, 167 P.3d at 1260 (citing Judiciary Committee Report on
HCSCS for Senate Bill No. 352, ALASKA H. JOURNAL SUPP. NO. 10 AT 1, 1970 ALASKA
H. JOURNAL 744).
163. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a). Indeed, in an unreported opinion, the
Alaska Supreme Court explicitly declared that under section 45.50.531(a) of the
Alaska Statutes “the court is given discretion to award an amount up to treble
damages.” Stanton v. Daly, No. S-4637, No. S-4750, 1993 WL 13563630, at *1
(Alaska May 26, 1993). Further, this case is at least indicative that a situation
existed where both the trial court and the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with a
reduction from treble damages. See id.
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considers necessary and proper, the statute “reinforc[ed] the provision’s
intent to make treble damages automatic.”164
In addition to treble damages, “[t]he court may provide other relief
it considers necessary and proper,”165 which generally allows the court
to award punitive damages.166 Under section 45.50.531(i) of the Alaska
Statutes, fifty percent of any award of punitive damages granted under
subsection (a) must go to the state’s general fund.167 Proponents of these
provisions believe that they encourage private suits filed by vulnerable
plaintiffs even when the potential windfall is very small. Opponents
believe that along with the absence of the need to show reliance and the
availability of class actions, defendants can be exposed to potentially
massive liability resulting in settlements for even meritless suits.168
C.

Attorneys’ Fees

Typically, in the United States each party bears its own litigation
costs, but to encourage private actions many states enable plaintiffs to
receive attorneys’ fees if victorious in consumer protection cases.169 The
Alaskan model of attorneys’ fees instead follows a modified version of
the typical “English Rule,” which allows for a full recovery of attorneys’
fees.170 The fees are calculated under Alaska Civil Rule 82(b) as a
percentage of the total judgment171 depending on the size of the
164. Kenai Chrysler, 167 P.3d at 1259. Here, the court was answering whether
punitive and treble damages could both be awarded; the fact that treble
damages could be automatic is not clearly necessary for the decision. See id. at
1259–60.
165. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a).
166. See Kenai Chrysler, 167 P.3d at 1259.
167. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(i). Punitive damages do not include treble
damages, as the statute distinguishes between treble damages, which are
automatic, and punitive damages, which fall under the category of other
remedies in subsection (a). See Kenai Chrysler, 167 P.3d at 1260.
168. See Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 38.
169. Stark & Choplin, supra note 38, at 494; supra text accompanying notes
64–67.
170. See Brandon Chad Bungard, Fee! Fie! Foe! Fum!: I Smell the Efficiency of the
English Rule: Finding the Right Approach to Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1,
33 n.138 (2006). For a discussion of the history of Alaska’s attorneys’ fees shifting
law, see Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: Attorney’s
Fee Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33, 37–46 (1996). Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 68 also presents a significant fee shifting rule, but it is beyond the
scope of this Note.
171. The judgment used to calculate damages is the net award, rather than a
gross award, if there are counterclaims. Fairbanks Builders, Inc. v. Sandstrom
Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 555 P.2d 964, 967 (Alaska 1976). Pre-judgment interest
is included in the judgment award. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1). Punitive damages
are also included in calculating attorneys’ fees, but the judge can choose not to
include punitive damages if he provides a reason. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day,
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judgment, whether the litigation was contested, and whether the case
went to trial.172 The judge may vary the attorneys’ fees awarded if the
judge considers the variance to be warranted based on a list of factors.173
The initial purpose of Alaska Civil Rule 82 was “to partially
compensate a prevailing party for the costs to which he has been put in
the litigation in which he was involved” and not “to be used . . . as a
vehicle for accomplishing any purpose other than providing
compensation where it is justified.”174 However, trial courts began to use
the imposition of attorneys’ fees for other purposes soon after Civil Rule
82’s adoption.175 Full attorneys’ fees are appropriate when the losing
party acted with bad faith or vexatious conduct176 or brought a frivolous

627 P.2d 204, 205 (Alaska 1981); see also Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 170, at 51–
52.
172. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1). In cases where the successful party does not
receive a monetary judgment, the court awards the party thirty percent of the
reasonable attorneys’ fees accrued. Id. at 82(b)(2).
173. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3). Those factors are:
(A) the complexity of the litigation;
(B) the length of trial;
(C) the reasonableness of the attorneys’ hourly rates and the number of
hours expended;
(D) the reasonableness of the number of attorneys used;
(E) the attorneys’ efforts to minimize fees;
(F) the reasonableness of the claims and defenses pursued by each side;
(G) vexatious or bad faith conduct;
(H) the relationship between the amount of work performed and the
significance of the matters at stake;
(I) the extent to which a given fee award may be so onerous to the nonprevailing party that it would deter similarly situated litigants from the
voluntary use of the courts;
(J) the extent to which the fees incurred by the prevailing party suggest
that they had been influenced by considerations apart from the case at
bar, such as a desire to discourage claims by others against the
prevailing party or its insurer; and
(K) other equitable factors deemed relevant. If the court varies an
award, the court shall explain the reasons for the variation.
Id.
174. Preferred Gen. Agency of Alaska v. Raffetto, 391 P.2d 951, 954 (Alaska
1964); see also Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30, 37 (Alaska 1979); Malvo v.
J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575, 588 (Alaska 1973); State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712,
731 (Alaska 1972).
175. Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 170, at 47.
176. Horton v. Hansen, 722 P.2d 211, 218 (Alaska 1986) (“The award of full
attorney’s fees is ‘manifestly unreasonable’ in the absence of a bad faith defense
or vexatious conduct by the losing party.” (quoting Mullen v. Christiansen, 642
P.2d 1345, 1351 (Alaska 1982))); Garrison v. Dixon, 19 P.3d 1229, 1234 (Alaska
2001) (“We will affirm an award of full, actual attorney’s fees under Rule 82
where the superior court finds that the losing party has engaged in vexatious or
bad faith litigation.”).
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suit.177 The application of Civil Rule 82 is difficult because much
discretion remains invested in courts to vary awards by considering a
number of complex factors.178
Civil Rule 82 obviously influences the language of the Alaska
UTPCPA, but plaintiffs still maintain a slight edge.179 Under section
45.50.537 of the Alaska Statutes, a prevailing plaintiff in a UTPCPA
claim “shall be awarded costs as provided by court rule and full
reasonable attorney[s’] fees at the prevailing reasonable rate” instead of
at the discounted rate provided in Alaska Civil Rule 82.180 The court,
however, still must agree that the fees are “reasonable.”181 Similar to the
discretion provided in Civil Rule 82,182 trial courts applying section
45.50.537 of the Alaska Statutes maintain broad discretion over what
constitutes “full reasonable attorneys’ fees” in light of the totality of the
circumstances.183 Even the state gets in on the act—if the attorney
general brings a consumer protection action on behalf of the public and
wins, the state receives its full fees, including the costs of
investigation.184
Prevailing defendants, on the other hand, generally receive only the
reduced fees from Civil Rule 82; they receive full reasonable attorney
fees only “[i]f the action is found to be frivolous.”185 “Frivolous” is
further defined in the Act as “not reasonably based on evidence or on
existing law or a reasonable extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law” or “brought to harass the defendant or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless expense.”186 In Garrison v. Dixon,187
177. Crawford & Co. v. Vienna, 744 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Alaska 1987) (reversing
a denial of attorneys’ fees because the suit was frivolous).
178. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82 (“(a) Allowance to Prevailing Party. Except as
otherwise provided by law or agreed to by the parties, the prevailing party in a
civil case shall be awarded attorney’s fees calculated under this rule.”). The
debate over the existence and application of Rule 82 is beyond the scope of this
Note. However, it is worth noting that, for Alaskans, the Rule may work just
fine.
179. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.537 (2010).
180. Id. § 45.50.537(a).
181. Kenai Chrysler Ctr., Inc. v. Denison, 167 P.3d 1240, 1260–61 (Alaska
2007).
182. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3).
183. Kenai Chrysler, 167 P.3d at 1260–61 (upholding a superior court’s twenty
percent reduction in attorneys’ fees despite not finding a problem with the
hourly billing rate or the number of hours billed). In Kenai Chrysler, the plaintiffs
argued that the standard to determine attorneys’ fees should be “whether the
fees were reasonably incurred by the prevailing plaintiff,” but the court rejected
this view for the broad discretion of the trial court. Id. at 1261.
184. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.537(d).
185. Id. § 45.50.537(b).
186. Id. § 45.50.537(e)(1–2).
187. 19 P.3d 1229 (Alaska 2001).
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plaintiffs brought a claim under the UTPCPA against a competing real
estate agent for allegedly improper advertisements.188 The court
supported a finding that the action was frivolous because “[t]he
[plaintiffs] never produced credible evidence that the central theme of
the ads . . . was unfair or deceptive. They did not produce even one
person who had read the ads and could testify to any confusion.”189
Additionally, defendants can recover enhanced attorneys’ fees at the
court’s discretion under Civil Rule 82.190 For instance, the court in
Garrison supported its decision to award full attorneys’ fees to the
defendant under Civil Rule 82 because the plaintiffs litigated the case in
bad faith to harass a business competitor.191
Recently, Di Pietro and Carns surveyed Anchorage trial lawyers
about their most recent trials and found that state courts granted
attorneys’ fees in about half of all state court trials.192 “The most frequent
criticism of Civil Rule 82 by personal injury defense attorneys was that
they could not collect fee awards from the losing plaintiffs.”193
Sympathetic witnesses and deep pockets can make defendants who
attempt to recover fees look like “ogres.”194 Moreover, some plaintiffs do
not have the funds to pay any award, refuse to pay, or declare
bankruptcy.195 Interestingly, the Alaska Supreme Court at one time had
a common law “public interest litigant exception” that essentially
ignored Civil Rule 82 for unsuccessful plaintiffs from whom extracting
attorneys’ fees would be against the public interest, but the exemption
was abrogated by statute in 2003.196

188. Id. at 1230–31.
189. Id. at 1235.
190. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3). In Garrison, a UTPCPA action, the court
declared, “[w]e will affirm an award of full, actual attorney’s fees under Rule 82
where the superior court finds that the losing party has engaged in vexatious or
bad faith litigation.” 19 P.3d at 1234.
191. Garrison, 19 P.3d at 1235.
192. Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 170, at 61.
193. Id. at 60.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (2010) (amended by § 2, 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws
ch. 86, 2); Benjamin J. Roesch, Comment, Erie Similarities: Alaska Civil Rule 68,
“Direct Collisions,” and the Problem of Non–Aligning Background Assumptions, 23
ALASKA L. REV. 81, 86–87 (2006); see also Anchorage Daily News v. Anchorage
Sch. Dist., 803 P.2d 402, 404 (Alaska 1990) (holding prevailing public interest
litigants were entitled to full reasonable attorneys’ fees, just as in the statute);
Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986, 993–94 (Alaska 1977) (no fees may be
awarded against an unsuccessful public interest litigant), superseded by statute,
2003 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 86.
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In their survey, Di Pietro and Carns found that of the fourteen cases
where the defendant won, only four had collected fees.197 The potential
award of attorneys’ fees did affect post-judgment settlements, which
was the most common reason given by attorneys for no award of
attorneys’ fees.198 Often, the award of attorneys’ fees would be waived
by the prevailing party in return for the losing party agreeing not to
appeal the ruling.199
Defendants are also restricted in terms of recovering attorneys’ fees
from class action suits.200 In Turner v. Alaska Communications Systems
Long Distance, Inc., the Alaska Supreme Court held that absent class
members are generally not responsible for costs associated with the
litigation, and a court cannot place an award for attorneys’ fees on
them.201 Holding absent parties who remain passive throughout the
litigation liable for fees could encourage some class members to opt out
and leave some without a remedy.202 Defendants can still recover from
named plaintiffs because “[the] ruling does not eliminate Civil Rule 82
attorney[s’] fees in class actions; it simply limits Civil Rule 82’s possible
reach to named parties . . . .”203 However, the court has also expressed
hesitancy to award attorneys’ fees to defendants in class actions, as
doing so might “undercut provisions meant to encourage plaintiffs to
bring meritorious claims.”204 If Civil Rule 82 applies too rigidly then it
may have a chilling effect on litigation that the state encourages.205
Meanwhile, class actions cause defendants to face larger potential losses
and higher costs than individual actions.206 While defendants see
increased damages and litigation costs, the potential for recovery of

197. Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 170, at 61.
198. Id. at 73.
199. Id. at 73–74.
200. Turner v. Alaska Commc’ns Sys. Long Distance, Inc., 78 P.3d 264, 266
(Alaska 2003).
201. Id. at 270.
202. Id. at 268.
203. Id. at 269.
204. Catalina Yachts v. Pierce, 105 P.3d 125, 131 (Alaska 2005).
205. Monzingo v. Alaska Air Group, Inc., 112 P.3d 655, 667 (Alaska 2005).
206. See id. at 666–67 (“Moreover, class action defendants are highly
motivated to vigorously defend any class action. Not only are the monetary
stakes high in most class actions, but defeat of a class action may preclude later
claims by absent members of the putative class and can often foreclose
devastating public relations and reputation costs for a company. Alaska Airlines
admitted as much when arguing for enhanced attorney’s fees: ‘Faced with a
billion dollar damages claim, a simultaneous motion to certify a 3.8 million
member class, and expert counsel brought in from the Outside, Alaska Airlines
was forced to respond in a proportionate manner . . . [and] expended a
reasonable number of hours and resources given the magnitude of Plaintiff’s
claim.’”).
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attorneys’ fees is diminished, particularly in UTPCPA claims where state
policy encourages plaintiffs to bring claims.
D.

Treatment of the Federal FTC Act

Like most states, Alaska modeled its UTPCPA after the federal FTC
Act.207 States vary, however, in the deference that they give to the
federal Act and to decisions issued by the FTC. The Alaska UTPCPA
states that “[i]n interpreting [section 45.50.471 of the Alaska Statutes] due
consideration and great weight should be given the interpretation of 15
U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (§ 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act).”208 The
provision was pivotal in the resolution of the previously discussed
landmark case O’Neill Investigations.209 There, the court found that the
FTC’s prior exercise of jurisdiction in the area of debt practices was
entitled to great weight in the state court decision-making process.210
The court further held that FTC consent orders shall be considered
interpretations with “clear precedential value.”211 Alaska is the only
state that gives FTC consent orders precedential value.212 Nevertheless,
in Alaska federal FTC precedent remains merely persuasive and not
mandatory in the application of the UTPCPA.
A recent case, ASRC Energy Services Power and Communications, LLC
v. Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc., examined the authority of FTC
precedent when it conflicts with prior Alaska case law.213 In O’Neill
Investigations, the court relied on an FTC decision to develop Alaska’s
standard for unfair acts or practices.214 In ASRC, Golden Valley
challenged the O’Neill Investigations decision because the FTC has since
modified the standard that the court relied on in O’Neill Investigations.215
The court looked to a similar case in Montana, which also affords “due

207. See Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 18; Schwartz & Silverman, supra note
8, at 3.
208. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.545 (2010) (emphasis added).
209. 609 P.2d 520, 529 (Alaska 1980).
210. Id.
211. Id.; see also Day, supra note 102, at 481.
212. Jeff Sovern, Good Will Adjustment Games: An Economic and Legal Analysis
of Secret Warranty Regulation, 60 MO. L. REV. 323, 389 (1995).
213. No. S-12630, No. 6617, No. S-12989, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118, at *24 (Alaska
Nov. 4, 2011).
214. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d at 529. This Note discusses the
O’Neill Investigations standard in part II.A at the text accompanying footnotes
146–150, supra.
215. ASRC, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118, at *28 (“[T]he 1974 legislature did not
intend that Alaska courts would be required to abandon Alaska precedent
where later changes in the federal approach conflicted with Alaska law.”).
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consideration and weight” to FTC interpretations.216 The Montana court
followed the old FTC standard while still claiming to give due
consideration and weight to FTC interpretations.217 However, in that
case the court noted that the FTC change placed the primary focus of the
inquiry on substantial consumer injury.218 Montana’s standard already
required substantial consumer injury, whereas Alaska’s standard also
considers injury to businesses and allows for business versus business
disputes. Consequently, the Alaska standard announced in O’Neill
Investigations strays further from the modified FTC standard than the
Montana standard does.
Nevertheless, the court in ASRC found that a majority of states still
use the old FTC standard, and therefore it inferred that using the old
FTC standard does not conflict with the newer FTC interpretations.219
Moreover, the court found that the due consideration and great weight
given to FTC interpretations should not overrule Alaska precedent
when later changes in the FTC’s approach conflict with Alaska
precedent.220
E.

Exempted Conduct

Alaska exempts several notable categories of consumer transactions
from coverage under its Act. Perhaps speaking to the importance of land
and the care required in its transfer, all transactions in real property are
exempted from the statute.221 Alaska is one of only seven states that has
both a “general” exemption and “specific” exemptions in its statute.222 In
the “general” exemption, the statute exempts prosecution under the Act
itself for all conduct “regulated” under any state or federal law; Alaska is
one of only two states that go that far in their exemptions.223 The Act has
216. Id. at *32–33 (citing Rohrer v. Knudson, 203 P.3d 759 (Mont. 2009)).
217. Rohrer, 203 P.3d at 763–64.
218. Id. at 763 n.1.
219. ASRC, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118, at *30–31.
220. Id. at *28.
221. See State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 414 (Alaska
1982); see also Nehf, supra note 96, at 65–67 (although there was no express
prohibition on including transfers of real property under the Act, the court
found that the provisions of the Act dealt with goods and services only, and not
the overall “conduct of trade or commerce”).
222. Scott Thomas O’Neal, Exempting the Protection Out of Michigan’s
Consumer Protection Act: A Call for Returning Consumer Protection to the Act, 84 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 237, 252–53 (2007). The other states are Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Michigan, Virginia, and Washington. Id. at 252.
223. Schwartz, Silverman & Appel, supra note 128, at 105. The other state is
Oklahoma. Id. The general exemption appears in section 45.50.481(a)(1) of the
Alaska Statutes. Critics have argued that exempting any conduct plausibly
“regulated” under law makes the exemption impossibly broad. See O’Neal, supra
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“specific” exemptions as well that explicitly exempt certain industries,
most notably the insurance industry.224 The result is that insurance
policyholders typically do not have private rights of action against
insurance companies under the Act; these claims are dealt with through
other aspects of state law. Finally, Alaska’s statutes and courts have
been oddly silent over whether Alaska exempts licensed professionals
from the Act, as many other states do.225 Presumably, claims filed under
the UTPCPA would skyrocket if doctors, lawyers, accountants, and
other such professionals were subject to the heightened damages awards
and lower standard of proof of the UTPCPA. The Alaska Supreme Court
has chosen not to reach this issue in several cases.226
F.

Unique Business-Related Causes of Action

The UTPCPA is a useful tool not only for consumer plaintiffs, but
increasingly for business plaintiffs as well, particularly small businesses.
The “unfair trade practices” portions of the statute are perhaps best fit
for businesses, but the decision in Alaska to lump the unfair competition
and consumer protection laws into one statute has resulted in a blurring
of the actions. It is clear today that in Alaska a business can sue another
business under the UTPCPA, though this is not explicit in the statute.
The statute also clearly covers traditional unfair competition practices
such as “passing off” and misrepresentation.227 In addition, businesses
can and should take advantage of the Act’s provisions that prevent
trademark dilution, misappropriation of trade dress, and injury to

note 222, at 239. The Alaska Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted unfair acts
as exempt only when the business is regulated and the unfair acts are somehow
prohibited under other law, basically deferring to the other statute’s penalties.
Matanuska Maid, Inc. v. State, 620 P.2d 182, 186 (Alaska 1980).
224. See O’Neal, supra note 222, at 253 (citing O.K. Lumber Co. v. Providence
Washington Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523, 528 (Alaska 1988)).
225. See Bauer, supra note 14, at 155.
226. See, e.g., Yukon-Koyukuk Sch. Dist. v. Arneson, No. 3AN–01–3791 CI,
2002 WL 34119570, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 2002).
227. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(1–2) (2010). Passing off and
misrepresentation are distinct but related theories of unfair competition that
form the basis of modern trademark law. Passing off involves the literal
presentation of goods in the market and “passing them off” as those of another.
It is based in traditional ideas of fraud and deceit. Misappropriation as a tort
relates to misuse of “intangible” investments made by others. Modern-day
applications include rights of publicity and trade secrets. See David L. Lange, The
Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law: An Appreciation of Two
Recent Essays and Some Thoughts about Why We Ought to Care, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 213, 220–21 (1996).

OQUINNWATTERSON.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/21/2011 5:18 PM

2011 RESHAPING THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

325

reputation.228 These actions present additional enforcement possibilities
when considered in conjunction with federal protection under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act or Alaska’s common law of trademarks.
Business actions become more complicated and controversial if the
business plaintiff sues under a theory of consumer protection rather
than a theory of unfair competition.229 Such actions were found to be
legal in Western Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equipment Service, Inc.,230
based on the premises that the UTPCPA is a remedial statute that must
be interpreted broadly and that legislative history showed that private
rights of action were intended to protect not only consumers but also
“honest businessmen.”231
The Alaska court system again upheld a business versus business
action in the recent case ASRC Energy Services Power and Communications,
LLC v. Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc.232 In that case, a contractor
sued an electric utility over contract disputes arising out of the
contractor’s requests for additional compensation.233 The contractor
amended its complaint, claiming that the utility had misrepresented
technical data about the project and failed to disclose details about the
construction that may have led to delays.234 Included in the amended
complaint was a UTPCPA claim.235 As the litigation proceeded, the
utility added UTPCPA counterclaims asserting that the contractor had
violated the Act by falsifying the documents supporting the requests for
additional compensation.236 Both sets of claims were eventually
presented to the jury, even though both parties (and the trial court)
struggled to define what acts constituted “unfair or deceptive” practices
under the UTPCPA.237
The full impact that this new context for consumer protection
litigation could have on Alaska courts and businesses has yet to be
determined, and it is a focus of this Note in Parts III and IV.

228. See Mitchell M. Wong, Note, Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine and the Law
of Trade–Dress Protection, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116, 1129 n.64 (1998) (citing
ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.180, 45.50.471(b)(1, 3, 4, 7, 11), 45.50.531(a) (2010)).
229. See Parts III–IV, infra.
230. 101 P.3d 1047 (Alaska 2004).
231. Id. at 1050–54.
232. No. S-12630, No. 6617, No. S-12989, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118 (Alaska Nov. 4,
2011).
233. Id. at *3–6.
234. Id. at *6.
235. Id.
236. Id. at *7.
237. Id. at *9–10. This case will be further discussed in Parts III and IV, infra.
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III. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION: FRANKENSTEIN’S MONSTER
ATTACKS
For all the benefits that consumer protection acts provide to society,
there is also little question that they have morphed far beyond what the
legislatures ever intended.238 The Alaska UTPCPA is no exception. This
part of the Note outlines four major problems with the Act: (1)
subjecting defendants to punishment without culpability, (2) lacking a
requirement to show reliance, (3) handling of attorneys’ fees; and (4)
allowing business versus business and business versus consumer
actions. Proposed solutions to these problems appear in Part IV.
Critics have identified generalized weaknesses in CPA structure.
Several commentators have concluded that CPAs put significant strain
on the judicial system without offsetting gains in real consumer
protection.239 Part of the strain comes from uneven application; there is
substantial variance in how CPAs are written and how they are
interpreted nationwide.240 This creates forum shopping and hinders
attempts to unify state laws and certify multistate class actions.241 The
statutes are too broad and assume “judicious exercise of discretion”—
which some commentators assert simply is absent.242 Alaska’s Act is no
exception. While many consumers have found justice through UTPCPA
actions, some consumers and many businesses have found frustration.

238. See J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection
Law: Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 347
(1992).
239. Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts
Really Little–FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 166 (2011); see also Henry N. Butler &
Jason S. Johnson, Reforming State Consumer Protection Liability: An Economic
Approach, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010) (“[A]ccording to leaders of the tort
reform movement, this massive upsurge in state CPA litigation does not reflect
some new wave of false and deceptive consumer marketing practices. Rather it
is a tide of, at best, highly doubtful claims brought by private class action
attorneys seeking a big payday, a tide of litigation that is symptomatic of a
broader litigation crisis. Overly broad judicial interpretation of state CPAs has
long been of concern to commentators, and economic criticism of judicial
expansion as to what constitutes actionable conduct under CPAs has become
increasingly intense.”).
240. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 17.
241. Id.
242. Sovern, supra note 25, at 467; see also Norton, supra note 114, at 644–45
(broad and vague CPA statutes and lack of procedural protections can lead to
defendants being punished for conduct not clearly unlawful).
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Punishment Without Culpability

As previously mentioned, the lower burdens of proof, treble
damages, and attorneys’ fees provided in the Act make it an attractive
tool for prospective plaintiffs. Automatic treble damages in particular
are a buzz saw for a defendant encountering a suit because the higher
damages award does not rest on any sort of culpable conduct. The
chance of an unfavorable result tripling an already large liability
dramatically changes the expected losses for the defendant, even if the
plaintiff has a meritless case.243 When defendants are likely to face
paying high damages whether their conduct was culpable or not, then
they have less incentive to refrain from culpable conduct.244
Even a business that carefully follows every regulation could be
exposed to massive liability if any part of its advertising or product
labeling is determined to have had the slightest capacity to deceive.245 A
state may be able to crow about a big money verdict while the corporate
defendant bears it in the short term; however, after one too many days
in the courthouse, the business may ultimately decide it is no longer
worthwhile to do business in the state.246 Thus, in the end certain
consumer victories may not be in the true public interest at all.247
Increased damages awards also distort settlement amounts. A
defendant who believes he has a meritorious defense may still settle.
The Alaska UTPCPA provides treble damages automatically,248 so the
risk of a high damages award may induce settlement from defendants
who would have otherwise won at trial.249 At the same time, the
incentives for plaintiffs are reversed; increased damages create the
possibility of a windfall settlement for a non-meritorious claim.
Recent examples in Alaska illustrate these issues. First, an actuarial
firm incorrectly estimated rising healthcare costs for a state pension,

243. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 33–34.
244. See Butler & Wright, supra note 239, at 65.
245. State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 534–35 (Alaska 1980);
Schwartz, Silverman & Appel, supra note 128, at 95.
246. See Sovern, supra note 212, at 402 (providing the example of automobile
companies readily offering “secret” free warranty programs to fix car problems
to restore and enhance goodwill only until states passed legislation mandating it
for all citizens on consumer protection grounds).
247. Sovern, supra note 25, at 437.
248. Kenai Chrysler Ctr., Inc. v. Denison, 167 P.3d 1240, 1259–60 (Alaska
2007) (“[Section 45.50.531(a) of the Alaska Statutes] appears to authorize treble
damages based solely on an allegation and finding that the UTPCPA has been
violated.”); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text.
249. See Butler & Wright, supra note 239, at 65.
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resulting in a nearly $2 billion shortfall for the pension.250 The state sued
partially under the UTPCPA, and the automatic treble damages
increased the risk of trial for the firm. The actuarial firm was sued for
$2.8 billion, and it quickly settled with the state for $500 million.251
Another action created a deterrent effect but was unevenly enforced: In
2009 two souvenir shops in Juneau targeting cruise ship tourists with
huge discount sale signs outside their shops were sued by the state for
unfair trade practices based on false advertising.252 One jewelry store
owner was fined $50,000, but cried foul since he was targeted and
dozens of others on the streets nearby were not.253 The deterrence
seemed to work, as far fewer signs were seen the next tourist season, but
at a cost: many retailers said sales were down because there was nothing
to herd tourists into the stores.254
B.

No Reliance

In order to encourage consumer protection suits and to deter fraud,
many jurisdictions eliminate the requirement for plaintiffs in consumer
protection suits to show reliance on a misrepresentation either as an
element of the tort or as a part of causation.255 Without a requirement for
plaintiffs to show reliance, defendants can be liable for damages due to
misrepresentations on which no one relied and that did no actual
harm.256 Further, without a requirement of reliance and causation,
defendants can be liable to all consumers of a good or service, not just
the victims; as a result potential defendants are over deterred from
activity.257 Plaintiffs—both businesses and consumers alike—have an
incentive to attempt to classify almost any claim as a consumer
protection violation because the lack of a reliance requirement makes the
claim easier to prove. As a result, cases that should be a simple breach of

250. Pat Forgey, Alaska’s Pension Suit Settled for $500M, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Jun.
13,
2010,
available
at
http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/061310/sta_653072396.shtml.
251. Id.
252. Kim Marquis, State Pursues Businesses with Bogus “Sale” Ads, JUNEAU
EMPIRE,
Sept.
9,
2009,
available
at
http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/090909/loc_491251093.shtml.
253. Id.
254. Kim Marquis, “Sale” Signs Less Prevalent in Tourist District, JUNEAU
EMPIRE,
May
14,
2010,
available
at
http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/051410/loc_638917941.shtml.
255. See Scheuerman, supra note 14, at 20, 30–31.
256. Id. at 31–32.
257. Id. at 39.
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contract claim between businesses258 become consumer protection
actions.
Claims under the UTPCPA do not require a showing of reliance;
“[a]ll that is required is a showing that the acts and practices were
capable of being interpreted in a misleading way.”259 In Odom v.
Fairbanks Memorial Hospital, the Alaska Supreme Court overturned a
hospital’s motion to dismiss a former employee’s claims, including a
UTPCPA claim, and held that a plaintiff does not even have to show an
injury.260 However, just one year after Odom, the Alaska Supreme Court
found in Garrison v. Dixon261 that a claim sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss under the standard expressed in Odom failed on summary
judgment.262 The Alaska Supreme Court specifically noted that the
plaintiff’s UTPCPA claim failed because a plaintiff must show an
ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of the UTPCPA
violation.263
C.

Attorneys’ Fees

Another problem in applying the UTPCPA lies in the attorneys’ fee
shifting provisions described in Part II. From one side, the threat of a
defendant obtaining even partial attorneys’ fees may cause plaintiffs not
to bring meritorious claims.264 Access to the courts and justice system is
a major concern regarding Civil Rule 82 overall, in particular when the
purpose of the statute is to encourage consumers to bring claims.265 As
one commentator has described the English Rule on attorneys’ fees:
“middle class and rich consumers are the usual beneficiaries of these
statutes. The poor consumer seems protected only marginally.”266
Alternatively, although successful defendants are entitled to
recover attorneys’ fees, they are much less likely to collect on the award
than successful plaintiffs. If the court does not find the action frivolous,
then the defendant must submit a motion for attorneys’ fees.267 The
258. See W. Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc., 101 P.3d 1047, 1049
(Alaska 2004); see also supra notes 227–237 and accompanying text.
259. Odom v. Fairbanks Memorial Hosp., 999 P.2d 123, 132 (Alaska 2000)
(quoting State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 534–35 (Alaska 1980)).
260. Id. at 132–33.
261. 19 P.3d 1229 (Alaska 2001).
262. Id. at 1236.
263. Id. at 1235 n.22.
264. Stark & Choplin, supra note 38, at 508–11.
265. See Catalina Yachts v. Pierce, 105 P.3d 125, 131 (Alaska 2005).
266. Stewart Macaulay, Address, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts
Scholarship and Teaching v. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 575, 586 (1989).
267. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.537(b) (2010).
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courts have already expressed hesitancy about imposing awards of
attorneys’ fees against plaintiffs when statutory purposes promote
litigation in that area.268 While plaintiffs automatically receive full
attorneys’ fees under the UTPCPA, defendants can normally only be
awarded reduced fees under Civil Rule 82.
Even when defendants win an award of attorneys’ fees, they may
never be able to collect the fees. In the events leading to Compton v.
Kittleson,269 Kittleson represented the Nelvises as plaintiffs in a UTPCPA
claim.270 The defendants in that UTPCPA claim offered to settle the
claim for $25,000, but the Nelvises rejected the claim due to a fee
arrangement that would have left them with only $3,000271 and the
possibility of receiving treble damages and full reasonable attorneys’
fees under the UTPCPA.272 The Nelvises lost on all counts in the
UTPCPA trial, and the court awarded the defendants almost $100,000 in
attorneys’ fees.273 That award, however, did not go directly to the
defendants because the Nelvises declared bankruptcy.274
D.

Business Actions

The most alarming faults of the UTPCPA have been revealed since
Western Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equipment Service, Inc., in which one
business was permitted to sue another on grounds of consumer
protection rather than unfair competition.275 Commentators on both
sides of the issue have debated the merits of allowing businesses to act
as de facto consumers for decades, with some calling for a “blurring of
the line between consumers and businesses”276 and, at the extreme,
granting businesses the right to litigate any and all disputes arising from
even the most routine and ordinary commercial transactions.277
268. See Catalina Yachts, 105 P.3d at 131.
269. 171 P.3d 172 (Alaska 2007). Compton is a case where the plaintiffs sued
an attorney for malpractice after they lost a UTPCPA claim. Id.
270. Id. at 173.
271. Id. at 174–75. Subsequent to adopting the fee arrangement but prior to
the settlement, a federal bankruptcy judge criticized a similar fee arrangement
and an informal ethics opinion ruled the fee arrangement likely put
impermissible pressure on clients to reject plea offers. Id.
272. Id. at 175.
273. Id. The fee was awarded under Alaska Civil Rule 68, which provides
attorneys’ fees as a result of the losing party rejecting a settlement offer. Id.
274. See id.
275. 101 P.3d 1047, 1050–54 (Alaska 2004).
276. See Michael Flynn & Karen Slater, All We Are Saying is Give Business a
Chance: The Application of State UDAP Statutes to Business–to–Business
Transactions, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 81, 84, 87 (2003).
277. Note, Toward Greater Equality in Business Transactions: A Proposal to
Extend the Little FTC Acts to Small Businesses, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1623 (1983).
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Although many businesses in this country are small and giving
businesses private rights as “consumers” would provide Main Street
Mom ‘n’ Pop stores with more protection,278 the rights of larger firms
must be considered as well. Many businesses have argued that the
increasingly “creative” actions brought under state CPAs are abusive
and that courts are overstepping their statutory authority.279 Even those
favoring business actions admit that it is at best “a form of consumer
protection one step removed”280 and that the lowered standards of proof,
along with treble and punitive damages provisions, provide incentives
to bring claims of little merit.281 In 1972 Massachusetts became the first
state to permit business versus business actions under its CPA.282 Texas
followed in the next few years.283 Texas allows any business with assets
under $25 million to sue another as a consumer, not just for unfair
competition.284 Business versus business actions are best facilitated by
states with catch-all provisions like Alaska’s;285 however, many of these
states have struggled after authorizing the actions with uneven
application.286 Whether or not a state allows business versus business
actions depends on its interpretation of certain definitions; all CPAs
define those who can sue as “persons” or “consumers,” and how courts
interpret those terms determines the issue.287 Unfortunately, legislative
history is lacking for many state CPAs, including the UTPCPA, because
most of them were hastily passed based on model acts.288
The reasoning in Western Star Trucks demonstrates that the plain
language of the UTPCPA supports business versus business actions

278. Id. at 1629–30; Flynn & Slater, supra note 276, at 87.
279. Franke & Ballam, supra note 238, at 348 (citing Wayne E. Green, Lawyers
Give Deceptive Trade Statutes New Day in Court, Wider Interpretations, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 24, 1990, at B1).
280. Note, supra note 277, at 1632 (emphasis added) (quoting David F. Bragg,
Now We’re All Consumers – The 1975 Amendments to the Consumer Protection Act,
28 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 8 (1976)).
281. Id. at 1639.
282. Michael C. Gilleran & L. Seth Stadfeld, Little FTC Acts Emerge in Business
Litigation, 72 A.B.A. J. 58 (1986).
283. Franke & Ballam, supra note 238, at 414.
284. Macaulay, supra note 266, at 587 (citing TEX. BUS. COM. CODE ANN. §
17.45 (Vernon 1987)).
285. Franke & Ballam, supra note 238, at 423.
286. See Flynn & Slater, supra note 276, at 93–97 (stating that Florida courts
have struggled with inconsistent precedent since authorizing business versus
business actions); Sovern, supra note 25, at 463 (describing how increased usage
of the Texas act in the wake of authorizing business versus business actions
helped expose many problems; the statute had to be amended eight times in
fifteen years).
287. Flynn & Slater, supra note 276, at 87.
288. See Kaplan & Smith, supra note 28, at 277 n.114.
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under a theory of consumer protection,289 but the court admitted that
dicta in prior case law and holdings in two of its prior cases did not
support such a theory.290 The court appealed to plain language and
legislative history arguments, stating that the act applies to any acts “in
the conduct of trade or commerce”291 and that it was “based on
legislation developed in large part by the Federal Trade Commission,
[and] is designed to meet the increasing need in Alaska for the
protection of consumers as well as honest businessmen from the
depredations of those persons employing unfair or deceptive trade
practices.”292 There is a problem with this line of analysis: honest
businessmen were indeed meant to be protected under the Act—not
under a consumer protection theory, but rather under an unfair
competition theory.
The Alaska court is not alone in its confusion; courts throughout
the country have lost track of the difference between unfair competition
and consumer protection, partly because so many states have lumped
both theories together in one statute.293 The ideological underpinnings of
the FTC and “Little FTC Acts” have been pegged as being progressive in
origin—to rectify uneven bargaining power between consumers and
monopolistic large corporations.294 If two companies are so uneven in
bargaining that the lesser needs protection like a consumer, then
perhaps the action is appropriate, but how often does this happen?295
Take, for example, the fact pattern in Western Star Trucks: Western Star
Trucks, Inc. breached an oral agreement that it had with a supplier, Big
Iron Equipment Service, Inc. Big Iron Equipment relied on the

289. 101 P.3d 1047, 1049–54 (Alaska 2004).
290. Id. at 1047–48, 1050–51 (citing State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660
P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982); Aloha Lumber Corp. v. Univ. of Alaska, 994 P.2d 991
(Alaska 1999)).
291. Id. at 1050 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(a) (2010)).
292. Id. at 1052 (emphasis in original) (quoting Judiciary Committee Report on
HCSCS for Senate Bill No. 352, ALASKA H. JOURNAL SUPP. NO. 10 AT 1, 1970 ALASKA
H. JOURNAL 744).
293. See Staci Zaretsky, Note, Trademark Law and Consumer Protection Law –
Deception is a Cruel Act: “Uniform” State Deceptive Trade Practices Acts and Their
Deceptive Effects on the Trademark Claims of Corporate Competitors, 32 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 549, 593 (2010).
294. Prentiss Cox, Goliath Has the Slingshot: Public Benefit and Private
Enforcement of Minnesota Consumer Protection Laws, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 163,
174–76 (2006).
295. See Zaretsky, supra note 293, at 574. Moreover, the Alaska Supreme
Court recently noted that “nowhere in Western Star did we suggest that relative
power influenced our decision.” ASRC Energy Servs. Power and Commc’ns,
LLC v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, Inc., No. S-12630, No. 6617, No. S-12989, 2011
Alas. LEXIS 118, at *39 (Alaska Nov. 4, 2011).
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contract.296 Western Star Trucks did not dispute the agreement had been
breached, but Big Iron Equipment sued (and won) in the lower court
based on the UTPCPA and thus was awarded treble damages for a
simple breach of contract claim.297 Once the Alaska Supreme Court
affirmed, the game was on: business versus business actions were
permitted.298 It is difficult to conceive of an action that a business could
bring against another business in Alaska that does not already fit under
another cause of action. False advertising or trademark dilution?
Businesses (not consumers) have redress under the federal Lanham
Act.299 Supplier reneged on a promise of goods? Such injuries are breach
of contract claims with typical reliance requirements and typical
damages, not trumped up “consumer protection” torts. The extent of the
damage in Alaska wrought by this misinterpretation of the statute
remains unclear, but a warning shot has already been fired: in 2005, an
action brought under the UTPCPA by a business survived the summary
judgment stage again, but this time, it was against a consumer.300 The
court reasoned that O’Neill Investigations demanded a liberal
interpretation of the statute, and thus all the defendants had to do was
show any “ascertainable loss” suffered in the course of “trade or
commerce.”301
The O’Neill Investigations standard was again applied in a business
action in the 2011 case ASRC Energy Services Power and Communications,
LLC v. Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc.302 What began as a contract
dispute between two businesses resulted in both parties adding
UTPCPA claims.303 The jury found that ASRC breached its contract and
violated the UTPCPA.304 However, the jury also attributed all of Golden

296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See id. at 1054.
299. See Dayle L. Wallien, The Unfair Trade Practice of False Advertising, ITEMS
OF INT. (2005), available at http://www.alaskalaw.com/falseadv.htm.
300. Corneliussen v. Bridgestone/Firestone North Am. Tire LLC, No. 3AN03-03558CI, 2005 WL 6399469, at *11–12 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2005).
However, summary judgment in Alaskan courts is a stricter standard than in
federal courts. See Meyer v. State of Alaska, Dep’t of Revenue, 994 P.2d 365, 368
(Alaska 1999). For instance, when a positive paternity test established a 99.98%
probability that the defendant was the father, a simple statement by the
defendant that he did not have intercourse with the plaintiff created a triable
issue of fact, and the Alaska Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment. Id.
301. Corneliussen, 2005 WL 6399469, at *11–12.
302. No. S-12630, No. 6617, No. S-12989, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118 (Alaska Nov. 4,
2011); see also notes 232–237, supra, and accompanying text.
303. ASRC, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118, at *6–7.
304. Id. at *10.
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Valley’s damages305 to the UTPCPA violations, meaning the damages
would treble in addition to Golden Valley receiving attorneys’ fees.306 As
a result of expanding the UTPCPA to business versus business disputes,
what should have been a typical contract dispute resulted in competing
UTPCPA claims, along with their reduced standards and enhanced
damages. Nevertheless, the court strongly upheld the viability of
business versus business actions from Western Star Trucks.307
Where are the limits? Can a fast food restaurant be sued for making
a mistake on a drive-thru order? For making someone fat? Similar
actions are actually happening across the United States based on statutes
like Alaska’s.308 Moreover, how long will it be before businesses begin to
reframe any contract dispute as a consumer protection action?

IV. PUTTING THE HORSE BACK IN THE BARN: PROPOSED
REVISIONS TO THE ACT
As a result of the problems discussed in Part III, the UTPCPA is
being used to assert novel causes of action not by consumers who have
been legitimately wronged, but by schemers targeting deep-pocketed
companies and unpopular defendants who will settle rather than
litigate.309 Given the liberal reading O’Neill Investigations allows,310 the
Alaska Supreme Court is unlikely to limit the application of the
UTPCPA; thus, the best hope for reform will be from statutory revisions
and clarifications. Alaska, like many other states, has now seen liability
or threat thereof created where none existed previously.311 Businesses
are now using the UTPCPA to sue competitors and other
unsophisticated smaller businesses as corporate retaliation for breach of
contract or misrepresentation that should be regulated through other
channels.312

305. The jury initially awarded Golden Valley damages arising from
responding to the false claims during the litigation, but the Alaska Supreme Court
reversed those portions of the damages award. Id. at *28–29.
306. Id. at *10–15.
307. Id. at *36–40 (citing W. Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc., 101
P.3d 1047, 1050–54 (Alaska 2004)).
308. See, e.g., Parham v. McDonalds Corp., No. CGC-10-506178 (Cal. Super.
Ct. filed Dec. 15, 2010) (class action suit brought under consumer protection laws
against McDonalds because they include toys in children’s “Happy Meals”).
309. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 37.
310. See Corneliussen v. Bridgestone/Firestone North Am. Tire LLC, No.
3AN-03-03558CI, 2005 WL 6399469, at *11–12 (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2005).
311. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 8, at 3–4.
312. See id.
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As the Western Star Trucks court alluded, Alaska’s UTPCPA is
intended to protect honest businessmen313—just not quite in the way the
court suggested. The nature of the protection that an honest
businessman should receive through CPAs is grounded in unfair
competition, not consumer protection. The harmed business should
have a right to regain sales lost from customers who were induced to
buy from a dishonest merchant.314 The honest businessman should have
no action for, say, an allegedly deceptive sale sign posted by a
competitor. Perhaps he may have a right under the federal Lanham Act,
particularly if there was co-opting, infringement, or other mark
misrepresentation, but he should have few if any unique rights in state
courts under the guise of “consumer protection.”315 Furthermore, Alaska
has robust state law trademark protection that may cover these cases in
the absence of new causes of action under the UTPCPA.316
Constant creation of new causes of action also betrays the
UTPCPA’s supposed reliance on and deference to the federal FTC Act. If
a business diligently followed the regulations of the FTC or other federal
agencies in developing marketing, it should reasonably expect not to be
hauled into court under a state law that mimics much of the language
and all of the same policy goals.317 Some of these problems would be
alleviated in Alaska if the legislature made a few relatively simple
changes to the text of the Act. The UTPCPA provides plaintiffs with a
lower burden of proof through the absence of showing reliance,
automatic increased damages, full attorneys’ fees if they win, and a low
likelihood of actually paying attorneys’ fees if they lose. The
combination of these incentives encourages plaintiffs to find creative
ways to classify their actions as UTPCPA violations. Cabining at least
some of these incentives would reduce the abuse of the UTPCPA.
The Alaska Supreme Court could limit creations of new actions
under the UTPCPA by building on the requirement expressed in
Garrison v. Dixon: that a plaintiff suffer an ascertainable loss of money or
property as a result of another person’s act or practice that violated the
UTPCPA. The courts could require a plaintiff to demonstrate loss
resulting from reliance on a misleading advertisement or statement.
Adding an element of reliance to the ascertainable loss of money
313. 101 P.3d 1047, 1052–54 (Alaska 2004).
314. Gold & Cohan, supra note 158, at 954.
315. See Zaretsky, supra note 293, at 565–66.
316. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.10–45.50.205 (2010); see also Filing an Alaska
State Trademark, ALASKA DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CMTY. & ECON. DEV.,
http://www.dced.state.ak.us/bsc/tmark.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2011)
(describing registration of trademarks in Alaska).
317. Schwartz, Silverman & Appel, supra note 128, at 104.
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requirement would prevent artful pleading from turning contract claims
between businesses into UTPCPA claims.
The UTPCPA explicitly defines only twelve terms, and merely
three of those could be considered broadly relevant: “consumer,”
“goods or services,” and “advertising.”318 The best way to tighten the
belt on undesirable business versus business and business versus
consumer actions is by tweaking the definitions of “consumer” and
“goods and services,” as those changes will have direct effects on
standing. This idea has precedent, as many states did the opposite in
order to expand these actions. If these actions are desired, then it should
say so explicitly in the statute. Alaska is one of only four states that
neither includes nor excludes businesses in its definitions of “consumer”
and “person.”319 Further, Alaska uses “person” in its definition of
“consumer” but does not define “person” for the purposes of the Act.320
By defining person as “a private citizen of Alaska,” the Act could limit
businesses’ standing in consumer protection actions. Alternatively the
legislature could supplement the definitions of “consumer” and “goods
or services” by clarifying that consumer transactions covered by the Act
are “primarily intended for personal, family, or household use.”321
When Massachusetts wanted to include business versus consumer
actions, it did the opposite, expanding its definition of “trade and
commerce” to include essentially any business transaction.322 Similarly,
North Carolina expanded its definition of “commerce” to include “all
business activities, however denominated.”323 Other states have limited
actions to things like franchise agreements and agricultural
transactions.324 Although the UTPCPA needs to be broad in order to be
flexible, courts need help with terms like these to ensure even
application.
A similar clarification effort would help in the area of exemptions.
If state agencies seem confused about what constitutes regulated and
exempt conduct, how should private citizens looking to bring actions be
expected to know?325 Licensed professional exemptions are a realm
318. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.561(a)(1–12) (2010). The defined terms are
advertising, cemetery lot, chain distributor scheme, consumer, dealing in
hearing aids, documentary material, examination of documentary material,
fresh, goods or services, hearing aid, knowingly, and seconds. Id.
319. Flynn & Slater, supra note 276, at 88 n.48.
320. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.561(a)(4) (2010) (“‘[C]onsumer’ means a person
who seeks or acquires goods or services by lease or purchase.”).
321. Dunbar, supra note 116, at 458.
322. Franke & Ballam, supra note 238, at 384.
323. Id. at 399; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75–1.1(b) (2010).
324. Note, supra note 277, at 1635–36.
325. See Schwartz, Silverman & Appel, supra note 128, at 101.
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where the Act is silent but clarification is desperately needed. As tort
reform gains momentum nationwide, CPAs may well be the only way in
the future to seek restitution from licensed professionals.326 There is
currently no exemption on the books in the UTPCPA, but state courts
have also noted that this is not a settled issue. In Yukon-Koyukuk School
District v. Arneson,327 a school district filed UTPCPA claims against an
attorney who had failed to provide promised services; the attorney
claimed that he should be exempt as a licensed professional regulated
by other bodies.328 The court dismissed the UTPCPA claims on other
grounds and stated there was no need to reach the question of licensed
professional exemption.329 While this demonstrated judicial restraint, the
court left open a question that now should be answered definitively.
Perhaps one option is to look to the FTC Act, which contains no such
exemption of any kind.330
A final change that would help smooth out implementation of the
Act would be to change the FTC Act from “guiding” authority worthy of
“great weight,” as it currently stands,331 to the greatest weight: making it
mandatory. In other states that have considered the same question,
commentators have concluded that without making the FTC
interpretations, consent orders, regulations, and decisions all
mandatory, a substantial defect results.332 If prospective defendants are
supposed to know the law and federal decisions are not “law,” but still
can be used convincingly against them, how can they be fairly charged
under a state CPA for violating a federal standard?333 Incorporating the
FTC Act into state law would alleviate this problem.334
The Alaska Supreme Court has already referenced one distinction
between the FTC Act and Alaska precedent.335 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) codified
changes to the FTC’s definition of what constitutes an unfair act or

326. Bauer, supra note 14, at 131.
327. No. 3AN-01-3791 CI, 2002 WL 34119570 (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 2002).
328. Id. at *6.
329. Id.
330. Bauer, supra note 14, at 175.
331. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.545 (2010) (“In interpreting [section 45.50.471 of the
Alaska Statutes] due consideration and great weight should be given the
interpretations of 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (§ 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act).”).
332. Norton, supra note 114, at 653.
333. Id. at 653–54.
334. See Pauline E. Calande, Note, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A
Response to the Demise of Implied Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L. J. 1144, 1148–
49 (1985).
335. ASRC Energy Servs. Power and Commc’ns, LLC v. Golden Valley Elec.
Ass’n, Inc., No. S-12630, No. 6617, No. S-12989, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118, at *28–30
(Alaska Nov. 4, 2011).
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practice.336 Those changes restricted the scope of what constitutes an
unfair act or practice, resulting in a conflict with the current Alaska
standard.337 In maintaining its standard, the Alaska Supreme Court
stated: “to provide broad protection to consumers and business people
in Alaska and to achieve the uniformity that was the goal of the 1974
legislature, we will adhere to our precedent standards for unfairness
and deception until such time that the legislature sees fit to incorporate the
limitations of 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) into Alaska’s [UTPCPA].”338
Some commentators have argued that making FTC Act provisions
mandatory authority in state courts is a poor idea; incorporation would
rob state court judges of flexibility in dealing with actions that might be
unique to their state.339 Others argue that the FTC Act is a poor model
for states to follow, since the adjudication process at the agency is
completely removed from state law issues and also vulnerable to
political pressures, funding crunches, and firm requirements of broad
public interest.340 All CPAs by design look to the FTC because as the
supreme consumer protection agency, the FTC will by default have the
primary policymaking role in the field and will also define the
continually evolving standard of what is unfair and deceptive.341 The
Alaska Legislature’s easiest move would be to incorporate the FTC Act
and allow the UTPCPA to become the “Little FTC Act” it was designed
to be. A more difficult solution would be to create some artificial
statutory substitute for the discretion that the FTC carefully employs.342
Regardless, something must be done to give defendants notice of the
law and to prevent consumer actions from deterring otherwise lawful,
even desirable, conduct.

CONCLUSION
Application of the Alaska UTPCPA by Alaska state courts is
currently falling short of the legislative mandate to protect Alaska
citizens from unfair and deceptive actions. Adherence to attorneys’ fees
awards to all prevailing plaintiffs, treble damages provisions, and
encouragement of business versus business and now even business
versus consumer actions discourages legitimate suits, incentivizes “pileon” suits, and suppresses otherwise desirable conduct. In order to best
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006).
ASRC, 2011 Alas. LEXIS 118, at *29.
Id. at *29–30 (emphasis added).
Mize, supra note 47, at 668–69.
Id. at 666–67; see also Sovern, supra note 25, at 452.
Schwartz, Silverman & Appel, supra note 128, at 99.
Sovern, supra note 25, at 462.
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serve not only the citizens and consumers of Alaska, but also small
businesses struggling in the worst economic climate in decades, the
Alaska Legislature should take the initiative to revise the Act. By
defining terms, making the federal FTC Act mandatory, and considering
revising the balance between attorneys’ fees and burdens of proof, the
legislature can send a clear message that deceptive trade practices will
not be tolerated, but they will be fairly and evenly adjudicated in Alaska
state courts.

